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The After-Acquired Evidence Rule: 
The Best of All Possible Worlds? 
SHARONA HOFFMAN 
Although the Supreme Court provided substantial guidance in its 
McKennon decision, it left several significant questions unanswered. 
These questions include the following: (1) To which antidiscrimina-
tion statutes does the McKennon standard apply? (2) What is the 
employer's standard of proof with respect to after-acquired evidence? 
(3) To what extent, if any, should compensatory damages, punitive 
damages, liquidated damages, and attomey fees be limited in after-
acquired evidence cases? ( 4) Which conditions constitute "extraordi-
nary equitable circumstances" that may alter the scope of relief under 
the McKennon standard? In order to find answers to these questions, 
the author examines the EEOC Enforcement Guidance conceming 
after-acquired evidence, which was published in December 1995.In 
addition, she analyzes several court decisions and legal commentar-
ies and provides her own insight into these issues. 
2uestions regarding after-acquired evidence arise in the arena of employment discrimination law when an employee challenges a d s arge as discriminatory, and the employer subsequently learns of 
particular acts of employee wrongdoing which would have justifi,ed the 
termination if previously known. 1 After-acquired evidence can be 
defined as evidence of employee misconduct that is not known by the 
employer at the date of the discharge. 2 
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 
(1995), the Supreme Court determined the extent to which after-
acquired evidence may serve as a bar to recovery in an employment 
discrimination case. In an effort to evaluate the impact of the 
McKennon decision on charges of discrimination filed with the United 
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the EEOC 
issued "Enforcement Guidance on after-acquired evidence and 
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 65 EPD 
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9[43,368 (1995)," Notice No. 915.002, dated December 14, 1995 
(hereinafter "Guidance" or "EEOC Enforcement Guidance"). In addi-
tion, numerous legal scholars have offered their own interpretations 
and criticisms of the McKennon decision and have expressed concern 
over questions left unanswered by the Supreme Court. This article 
analyzes the guidelines delineated by the McKennon opinion and the 
EEOC and discusses the after-acquired evidence issues yet to be 
elucidated by the courts. 
MCKENNON V. NASHVILLE BANNER PUBLISHING CO.: 
RESOLUTION OF A SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS 
The use of after-acquired evidence as a defense in employment 
discrimination cases was extensively debated for almost a decade prior 
to the issuance of the McKennon decision. Circuit courts which 
considered the issue reached conflicting decisions, making the after-
acquired evidence question ripe for resolution by the Supreme Court. 
Prior Circuit Court Decisions 
In Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 864 
F.2d 700 (lOth Cir. 1988), the Tenth Circuit held that after-acquired 
evidence functioned as a complete bar to recovery in a case alleging 
age and religious discrimination. The court of appeals affirmed the 
district court's granting of summary judgment to the employer based 
on evidence that the plaintiff, a State Farm claims representative, 
continued to falsify company records after being warned that such 
conduct would result in termination. Although the evidence was 
discovered four years after the date of discharge, the court determined 
that it precluded the plaintiff's recovery for claims of discrimination. 
The Summers rule was followed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits 
and inconsistently by the Seventh Circuit.3 
In contrast, in Wallacev. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th 
Cir. 1992), vacated pending rehearing en bane, 32 F.3d 1489 (1994), 
affirmed in part, revised in part, 62 F.3d 374 0995), the Eleventh Circuit 
ruled that evidence of an employee's application fraud, discovered after 
she had instituted suit for retaliation and sexual harassment, could not bar 
her from relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court 
rejected the Summers rule, deeming it "antithetical to the primary purpose 
of Title VII-'to achieve equality of employment opportunity"' by 
encouraging "employers to eliminate discrimination." The court stated 
that the Summers ruling invited employers to escape liability by rummag-
ing through an unlawfully discharged employee's background in order to 
discover flaws which it can claim would constitute legitimate reasons for 
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discharge. The Wallace approach was followed by the Third Circuit and 
at times by the Seventh Circuit, which itself issued contradictory rulings 
regarding after-acquired evidence.4 
Facts and Holding of McKennon 
In 1995, in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. the 
Supreme Court resolved the split, essentially adopting the Wallace 
approach. The case involved an age discrimination claim brought by a 62-
year-old woman who had worked for Nashville Banner Publishing 
Company for 30 years before being discharged, purportedly as part of a 
reduction-in-force. During her deposition, McKennon admitted that prior 
to being terminated, she had copied and removed from the defendant's 
headquarters several confidential financial documents because she 
wanted "insurance" and "protection" once she became concerned that 
"she was about to be fired because of her age." When it learned of the 
misconduct, the defendant sent McKennon a letter informing her that she 
had violated her job responsibilities and advising her that had it learned 
of her misconduct while she was still employed, it would have terminated 
her immediately as a consequence of her actions. 
For purposes of summary judgment, the employer conceded that 
it had discriminated against McKennon but argued that McKennon was 
entitled to no relief due to her misconduct. In a unanimous opinion, 
the Supreme Court held that after-acquired evidence cannot insulate 
an employer from liability for violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA). The Court noted that the ADEA and Title VII 
seek to achieve "the elimination of discrimination in the workplace" by 
serving as mechanisms of deterrence and by creating a right of action 
for victims of discrimination by which they can obtain redress for 
wrongs suffered in violation of the law. The Justices concluded that "[i]t 
would not accord with this scheme if after-acquired evidence of 
wrongdoing that would have resulted in termination operates, in every 
instance, to bar all relief for an earlier violation of the Act." 
Under the McKennon ruling, however, the employee's misconduct 
is relevant to the formulation of the remedy to be awarded in each case. 
The Court stated that it was sensitive to the "employer's legitimate 
concerns" and the "lawful prerogatives of the employer in the usual 
course of its business." It thus deemed it appropriate to consider the 
employee's wrongdoing in determining the extent of the complainant's 
remedy even if the misconduct is unearthed only in the course of 
discovery in a discrimination action and would have remained 
undetected absent the lawsuit. 
The Court ruled that an employer that seeks to rely on after-acquired 
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evidence must establish that the wrongdoing was so severe that the 
employee would in fact have been terminated due solely to the 
misconduct had the employer been aware of it. Once the certainty of a 
discharge has been established, however, neither reinstatement nor front 
pay constitutes an appropriate remedy. In fact, it would be illogical to 
order reinstatement of an individual whom the employer could lawfully 
fire immediately upon the commencement of his re-employment due to 
prior misconduct. Furthermore, the Court instructed that back pay should 
be calculated "from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new 
information was discovered." The Court added, however, that courts may 
also consider "extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the 
legitimate interests of either party," thus declining to create an 
unyieldingly rigid rule but leaving unanswered questions regarding the 
nature of the egregious circumstances which would justify a deviation 
from its general standard. 
The Court acknowledged that defendants may have an incentive 
to engage in extensive discovery into the former employee's back-
ground and job performance in order to resist claims brought under the 
ADEA. Such discovery would seek solely to unearth instances of prior 
employee misconduct that would limit liability with respect to the 
plaintiffs ADEA claim. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the 
threats of attorney fees and Rule 11 sanctions will be sufficient to deter 
most discovery abuses. 
The Unclean Hands Defense 
It is significant to note that the Court explicitly rejected the "unclean 
hands defense" for after-acquired evidence cases involving employ-
ment discrimination claims. The clean hands doctrine proposes that 
equity will not grant relief to a party who, "in his prior conduct has 
violated conscience or good faith or other equitable principle."5 The 
Court rejected the unclean hands defense based on the fact that the 
case, although a private suit, involved "important public purposes" 
and, as an action brought under a federal antidiscrimination statute, 
implicated congressional authorization of "broad equitable relief to 
serve important national policies." 
One commentator notes several additional reasons for the rejection 
of the unclean hands defense.6 She notes that the application of the 
unclean hands defense in employment discrimination cases would 
result in inequity in most cases. The previously undiscovered em-
ployee misconduct generally causes the employer little if any damage. 
In McKennon the harm consisted of limited financial and personnel 
information being revealed to an employee's husband. In cases of 
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falsification of a detail on the employee's resume, the employer often 
suffers no injury whatsoever. By contrast, the victim of discrimination 
suffers significant psychological and financial injury due to the loss of 
the job, income, benefits, reputation, dignity, and sense of self-worth? 
Furthermore, courts have imposed a "same transaction" limitation, 
requiring that the conduct giving rise to the defense of unclean hands 
be connected to the controversy at issue.8 Thus, if "the right claimed 
in the suit did not accrue because of [the misconduct], the misconduct 
will be held to be collateral and not to defeat the right to affirmative 
relief."9 In employment discrimination cases involving after-acquired 
evidence, the victim's right to recovery for the employer's discrimina-
tion does not arise from the employee's wrongdoing, which often 
precedes the unlawful adverse employment decision by years if not 
decades. By definition, the employer's decision is made without 
knowledge of or regard to the employee's misconduct, which is 
discovered only after the fact. Thus, for a multitude of reasons the clean 
hands doctrine cannot be utilized by defendants in after-acquired 
evidence cases related to employment discrimination claims. 
FURTHER ANALYSIS BY THE EEOC, THE COURTS, 
AND LEGAL SCHOLARS 
The McKennon decision provided much-needed guidance as to 
the remedies available to plaintiffs in after-acquired evidence cases. 
Nevertheless, the Court left several significant questions unanswered. 
These questions include the following: (1) To which antidiscrimination 
statutes does the McKennon standard apply? (2) What is the employer's 
standard of proof with respect to after-acquired evidence? (3) To what 
extent, if any, should compensatory damages, punitive damages, 
liquidated damages, and attorney's fees be limited in after-acquired 
evidence cases? ( 4) Which conditions constitute "extraordinary equi-
table circumstances" that may alter the scope of relief under the 
McKennon standard? Detailed answers to most of these questions are 
contained in EEOC Guidance published in December 1995. In addi-
tion, several court decisions and legal commentaries provide further 
insight into the after-acquired evidence defense. 
To Which Antidiscrimination Statutes Does the 
McKennon Decision Apply? 
The McKennon decision applied explicitly only to after-acquired 
evidence in ADEA cases. The Supreme Court noted, however, that the 
"ADEA is but part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in 
the workplace nationwide." It cited Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
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1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 as additional 
statutes which prohibit discrimination in the workplace. 
Based on this statement, the EEOC determined that the principles 
articulated in the McKennon decision are applicable in Title VII and ADA 
cases. In addition, the Tenth Circuit, in Wallacev. Dunn Construction Co., 
Inc., 62 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995), concluded, based on the above-cited 
Supreme Court language, "that the holding of McKennon is applicable to 
claims brought under Title VII and tl1e Equal Pay Act." It is thus e:il.'tremely 
unlikely that employers will be able to utilize after-acquired evidence to 
defeat non-age employment discrimination claims by arguing that the 
McKennon decision is limited only to ADEA cases. 
The Employer's Standard of Proof 
The Supreme Court established that an employer that seeks to 
utilize after-acquired evidence to limit the remedy in a particular case 
"must first establish that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the 
employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone 
if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge." This 
standard was elucidated by the Ninth Circuit in McDonnell Douglas 
Helicopter Co. v. O'Day, 79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1996). The court held that 
an employer must "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it 
would have fired the employee for that misconduct." It explicitly 
rejected the plaintiffs contention that the employer should be required 
to meet a higher burden of proof, that is, to prove by "clear and 
convincing evidence" that the individual would have been terminated. 
The EEOC Enforcement Guidance grapples with the issue of how 
an employer might prove that it would have terminated the employee 
solely because of the misconduct in question. The clearest scenario, of 
course, is one in which other employees have committed the identical 
wrongdoing. In such cases the employer's reaction to the other 
incidents can be examined to determine how it would have responded 
to the plaintiffs misconduct.10 Thus, if the employer had not terminated 
other employees who engaged in behavior identical to that in question, 
the employer could not utilize the after-acquired evidence to curtail 
back pay or eliminate other forms of relief. 
The case is far more difficult if the employer has no prior 
experience with the misconduct at issue. In such instances, the EEOC 
suggests that the following three factors be considered: (1) whether the 
misconduct is criminal in nature; (2) whether the employee's behavior 
compromised the integrity of the employer's business, such as via 
divulgence of trade secrets or other confidential information; or (3) 
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whether the adverse employment action appears reasonable and 
justifiable in light of the employee's misconduct. In addition, the court 
might determine whether the employer has ever stated that the conduct 
in question will lead to termination in its employee handbook, in a 
policy memorandum, or in an orientation or other training session. 
The misconduct in McKennon occurred during the plaintiff's employ-
ment. Commonly, however, the after-acquired evidence consists of a 
misrepresentation on the employee's resume or application form, which 
the employer discovers after it begins investigating the individual's 
background in the face of a discrimination claim. 11 One might ask whether 
in such cases the employer should be required to prove that the employee 
would have been fired upon discovery of the misrepresentation during 
his or her employment or whether the employer need prove only that the 
employee would not have been hired if the misstatement had been 
discovered prior to commencement of the employment. 
The Fifth Circuit provided an answer to this question in a case entitled 
Shattuck v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 49 F.3d 1106 (5th Cir. 1995), which 
involved an employee who had stated in his application that he was a 
college graduate, but was found on the eve of trial to have completed less 
than a year of college work. The court ruled that "the pertinent inquiry, 
except in refusal-to-hire cases, is whether the employee would have been 
fired upon discovery of the wrongdoing, not whether he would have been 
hired in the first instance." The EEOC Enforcement Guidance adopted the 
Fifth Circuit rule, adding that logically, in discriminatory refusal-to-hire 
cases, the pertinent question is whether the employer would have actually 
rejected the candidate had it been aware of the subsequently discovered 
evidence during the application process. Since the plaintiff in a discrimi-
natory failure-to-hire case never began working for the employer, the 
question of whether he would have been tenninated had he become an 
employee is irrelevant. 
The distinction between the two inquiries is a significant one. The 
Fifth Circuit in Shattuck reasoned that an employer may retain an 
employee who has performed successfully even though the employee 
does not have the qualifications claimed in his application materials. 
Thus, an employee guilty of application fraud might be forgiven for the 
wrongdoing once he proves himself to be a valuable performer and 
after the employer has invested substantial resources in training him, 
even though he would not have been initially hired had his misrepre-
sentation been discovered during the application process. In such 
instances, the employer suffers no injury as a result of the employee 
wrongdoing, and equity would not be served by limiting recovery for 
an unlawful act of discrimination on the part of the employer. 
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Furthermore, it is reasonable to impose upon the employer a high 
burden of proof in an application fraud case since employers have the 
opportunity to conduct background checks regarding their applicants 
and to call references to verify information contained in the employ-
ment application. In fact, it may be disingenuous for an employer that 
was lax and did not investigate the applicant's history at the time of hire 
to claim that it is so offended by the misrepresentation that it would 
have fired the employee fOi the wrongdoing and should benefit from 
the after-acquired evidence rule. 
Compensatory Damages 
The McKennon Court determined that in after-acquired evidence 
cases, back pay will be limited to that which accrued between the date 
of the discriminatory termination and the date of discovery of the 
employee's wrongdoing. The Court, however, did not reach the issue of 
the availability of compensatory and punitive damages in after-acquired 
evidence cases. The EEOC, in its Guidance, advised that pecuniary 
compensatory damages, that is, damages representing out-of-pocket 
losses such as job search expenses, like back pay, stop accruing on the 
date the evidence of wrongdoing is discovered, if that misconduct would 
justify termination by the employer. The Guidance quotes the language 
of the McKennon Court, which emphasizes that the "object of compen-
sation is to restore the employee to the position he or she would have been 
in absent the discrimination" without ignoring "the lawful prerogatives of 
the employer in the usual course of its business. "12 Curtailing pecuniary 
compensatory damages at the time of discovery of the wJsconduct is 
sensible since at that time the employee would have been terminated in 
any case and would have begun accruing the expenses in question 
regardless of the discrimination. 
In contrast, the EEOC has concluded that nonpecuniary compen-
satory damages, those designed to compensate the victim of discrimi-
nation for emotional harm, are unaffected by the discovery of after-
acquired evidence. In McKennon the Supreme Court emphasized that 
remedies in after-acquired evidence cases should be limited not in 
order to punish the employee, but rather out of consideration for the 
valid business concerns of the employer. The EEOC Guidance notes 
that "no legitimate business prerogatives are served by exonerating a 
proven discriminator from paying the full cost of the emotional damage 
caused by the discrimination."13 Nonpecuniary compensatory dam-
ages, provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, are designed to 
compensate the victim for emotional distress suffered because of the 
discrimination itself. 14 Consequently, the employee should be entitled 
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to the full extent of proven damages. caused by the humiliation and 
degradation of discrimination, even if he or she would have been 
terminated for other reasons. On the other hand, the employee could 
be denied compensatory damages for emotional distress suffered after 
the date of discovery of the prior misconduct if the distress is linked 
not to the fact of discrimination but rather to the condition of 
unemployment, which presumably would have occurred regardless of 
the employer's unlawful decision. 
Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages are appropriate when a plaintiff proves that the 
employer engaged in discrimination "with malice or with reckless 
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved indi-
vidual."15 The EEOC has determined that punitive damages, like 
nonpecuniary compensatory damages, are unaffected by the discovery 
of after-acquired evidence that would justify termination. The EEOC's 
Guidance notes that in Russell v. Microdyne, 65 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 
1995), the Fourth Circuit indicated without discussion that the date of 
discovery of the employee's wrongdoing would limit not only back pay 
but also all compensatory and punitive damages. The EEOC Enforce-
ment Guidance explicitly rejected the Microdyne court's decision. With 
respect to punitive damages, the Guidance asserts that "[i]t is the 
employer's motivation at the time of the discriminatory conduct that is 
relevant in determining the propriety of punitive damages."16 
The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant for its 
unlawful conduct and to deter other employers from behaving 
similarlyY In after-acquired evidence cases, the employer is ignorant 
of the misconduct at the time it perpetrates the discriminatory 
employment decision. Consequently, limiting punitive damages due to 
the belated discovery of employee wrongdoing would be inconsistent 
with the goals of deterrence and retribution.18 
It must be recalled that back pay in after-acquired evidence cases 
may be very limited due to the discovery of the evidence of wrongdo-
ing very soon after the date of the discriminatory discharge and that 
reinstatement and front pay are always excluded.19 In light of these 
restrictions, some commentators have noted that discrimination cases 
involving after-acquired evidence issues may not be economically 
viable unless the plaintiff can recover substantial compensatory and 
punitive damages. Victims of discrimination may hesitate to file 
charges of discrimination with the EEOC or to bring suit if their 
recovery will be limited to a minimal amount of back pay and 
declaratory relief. Thus, employers that violate federal antidiscrimina-
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tion laws would not be prosecuted and the policy goals of these 
statutes would be undermined. 20 
Liquidated Damages 
Liquidated damages are available under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act in cases of "willful violations" of the Act. 21 Liquidated 
damages are intended to be punitive in nature22 and are limited to an 
amount equal to the employee's lost wages. 23 Similarly, liquidated 
damages are available under the Equal Pay Act in an amount equal to 
the employee's unpaid compensation. 24 Under the Equal Pay Act, 
liquidated damages are mandatory once a violation is found by the 
court unless "the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that 
the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that 
he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was 
not a violation" of law.25 
The EEOC Guidance provides that liquidated damages are avail-
able in age discrimination and Equal Pay Act cases even where after-
acquired evidence of employee misconduct which would justify 
termination is found. Since liquidated damages are punitive in nature, 
their award is justified by the sarrie rationale that applies to punitive 
damages, discussed above. The employer's motive in after-acquired 
evidence cases is in fact discriminatory since the proof of prior 
employee misconduct is a windfall, obtained by the employer only 
after the unlawful adverse employment decision is made. Thus, the 
employer should be punished via the imposition of liquidated damages 
for conduct which violates the federal antidiscrimination statutes. 
Nevertheless, since liquidated damages are limited to an amount 
equal to that of the lost wages recovered by the victim of discrimina-
tion, these damages are significantly affected by the McKennon 
decision. Liquidated damages will be limited to the back pay accrued 
by the employee between the date of the adverse employment action 
and the date upon which the evidence of misconduct was discovered. 
Attorney Fees 
The EEOC Guidance does not address the issue of attorney fees, 
presumably because, as a federal governmental agency, the EEOC 
cannot recover such fees. 26 The McKennon decision explicitly states 
that attorney fees are available in after-acquired evidence cases, stating 
that "the authority of the courts to award attorney's fees, mandated 
under the statute, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) ... will deter most 
[discovery] abuses." A question remains, however, as to whether 
attorney fees should be reduced if the employer is able to prove that 
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it would have terminated the employee due to the subsequently 
discovered wrongdoing. 
In Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., Toastmaster Division, 985 
F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993), a Seventh Circuit case which precededMcKennon 
but is consistent with its ruling, the court indicated that a portion of the 
attorney fees awarded below must be deducted to reflect the time after 
the discovery of the plaintiff's falsification of his educational qualifications. 
This standard, however, seems unfair and contrary to the purpose of the 
federal antidiscrimination statutes. In many cases, evidence of misconduct 
may be discovered very soon after a charge of discrimination is filed with 
the EEOC, 27 when the employer conducts a thorough investigation of the 
employee and his or her background in order to defend itself against the 
allegations. Many employees do not hire attorneys until their cases are 
ready for litigation, after the EEOC has completed its processing of the 
charge of discrimination and the evidence of the employee's tainted 
history has been unearthed. 
In the alternative, employers may discover the after-acquired 
evidence very soon after the hiring of the attorney, during the plaintiff's 
deposition early in discovery. In such cases, under the Kristufek rule, 
the attorney would be entitled to little if any attorney fees. As a result, 
plaintiffs would be discouraged from filing meritorious discrimination 
claims, and the congressional objective of eliminating discriminatory 
employment practices would be thwarted. 
Furthermore, as one commentator has argued, discrimination suits 
are filed first and foremost in order to prove employer liability.28 The 
after-acquired evidence defense is merely an affirmative defense. The 
need to prove liability does not disappear once after-acquired evidence 
is discovered since the case is not subject to dismissal at that point and 
the victim of discrimination may still be entitled to a substantial 
recovery. Consequently, attorney fees should not be curtailed at the 
time the evidence of misconduct is discovered. 
In an after-acquired case, however, it may be reasonable to 
disallow the award of attorney fees for time devoted to the issue of 
after-acquired evidence and to unsuccessfully resisting a reduction of 
the recovery due to the employer's affirmative defense. Attorney fees 
are awarded to the prevailing party in appropriate cases.29 Since the 
plaintiff in such cases does not prevail with respect to the after-
acquired evidence issue, the plaintiff should not be awarded fees 
related to that defense. 
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Supreme Court 
determined that where a plaintiff has achieved only limited success, the 
award of attorney fees for all hours spent by the attorney on the litigation 
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may be excessive. The Supreme Court instructed that "[t]he district court 
may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may 
simply reduce the award to account for the limited success." Eliminating 
hours expended on an unsuccessful attempt to disprove the employer's 
after-acquired evidence defense would be consistent with the Supreme 
Court's approach. Under this standard, attorneys would be required to 
maintain records as to whether their work was related to issues of liability 
and allowable damages or issues of after-acquired evidence. 
Extraordinary Equitable Circumstances That May 
Alter the Scope of Relief 
In the McKennon opinion, the Supreme Court instructed that "[i]n 
determining the appropriate order for relief, the court can consider 
taking into further account extraordinary equitable circumstances that 
affect the legitimate interests of either party." The Court thus suggested 
that in unusual circumstances courts may deviate from the McKennon 
guidelines as to relief but did not provide any guidance as to what 
events would constitute such extraordinary circumstances. 
The EEOC Guidance provides that additional relief is warranted 
when the after-acquired evidence is unearthed during a retaliatory 
investigation by the employer after a charge of discrimination is filed 
with the EEOC. In some instances, an employer may launch an 
extensive investigation into the employee's background not in order 
to verify the truth or falsehood of the complainant's allegations, but 
specifically in order to uncover derogatory information about the 
employee or to discourage other employees from filing charges of 
discrimination in the future. Since retaliation is itself unlawful under the 
federal antidiscrimination laws,30 the employer should not benefit from 
its retaliatory conduct by enjoying a reduction in the back pay owed 
to the victim of discrimination. The EEOC Guidance states that where 
an employer commences a retaliatory background check with respect 
to the employee during an investigation of a charge of discrimination, 
back pay should be extended to the date the complaint is resolved. 
The EEOC Guidance has been criticized by some plaintiff's 
attorneys as being too lax and unduly generous to employers.31 Civil 
rights attorneys have emphasized that the EEOC's rule is limited to 
retaliatory investigations conducted during the administrative process, 
before suit has been filed in court. The EEOC has not stated that back 
pay should be extended in cases of exceptionally aggressive and 
abusive discovery during litigation. Plaintiffs' attorneys have suggested 
that "[u]sing an imprudent private investigator, invading the plaintiff's 
privacy, bringing the plaintiff into disrepute among friends or acquain-
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tances, and similarly extreme steps, "32 during discovery should also 
justify a deviation from the McKennon limitation on back pay damages. 
Overzealous discovery practices, however, are unlikely to be 
considered "extraordinary equitable circumstances" by the courts. 
Discovery abuses can be addressed by the courts through a variety of 
channels including sanctions and protective orders. The extent and 
nature of discovery means are routinely challenged by the parties, 
particularly in discrimination cases involving highly personal and 
emotional issues. The Supreme Court itself in McKennon suggested 
that traditional means such as the award of attorney fees and Rule 11 
sanctions be utilized to deter and punish inappropriate conduct during 
litigation. Consequently, the use of questionable discovery methods 
should not justify a deviation from the McKennon standard. 
Employers are entitled to utilize after-acquired evidence to limit 
liability under McKennon and have a financial incentive to discover the 
evidence as quickly as possible. Moreover, in order to establish a valid 
defense to unlawful termination cases, employers often must examine 
questions regarding the employee's job performance and qualifica-
tions. The EEOC Guidance thus could not have meant to forbid the 
employer from conducting nonabusive and reasonable research into 
the employee's background during the EEOC's administrative process. 
Instead, the EEOC condemned retaliatory investigations commenced 
solely for the purpose of unearthing "derogatory" information which 
would serve only to embarrass the complaining party or which were 
designed to deter other employees from filing charges via harassment 
and ridicule of the individual in question. Such conduct by the 
employer during the EEOC's administrative process, which is not 
subject to constraint by the court since the case is not yet in litigation, 
may in extreme circumstances be deemed to justify an extension of the 
back pay award under the McKennon standard. 
In addition, courts may consider the nature and severity of the 
discrimination itself in formulating the remedy in a particular case. In 
some instances the discriminatory termination may be accompanied by 
abusive conduct such as racial slurs or violence or the discharge may 
be designed maliciously to maximize harm to the victim, such as where 
an older worker is unlawfully terminated while the employer knows 
his or her spouse is severely ill and needs costly medical treatment. In 
such egregious cases courts may not allow employers to utilize after-
acquired evidence to limit recovery. 
CONCLUSION 
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. the Supreme 
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Court delineated guidelines as to how after-acquired evidence affects 
the remedy available to the complaining party in cases where unlawful 
discrimination is proved but the employer discovers evidence of 
employee misconduct that was severe enough to justify the plaintiff's 
termination had it been previously known. The Court's ruling has been 
explicated in EEOC Guidance and by other commentators. 
In cases where the employer can establish that it would in fact have 
terminated the employee for the misconduct, reinstatement and front 
pay awards are inappropriate. In general, back pay awards and 
pecuniary compensatory damages are limited to damages that accrued 
between the date of the unlawful discharge and the date of discovery 
of the wrongful conduct. Compensatory and punitive damages awards 
should not be reduced due to after-acquired evidence, and liquidated 
damages are by definition limited to the amount of back pay awarded. 
Attorney fees present the most difficult question, since they are 
discussed by neither the Supreme Court nor the EEOC Guidance. 
Attorney fees should probably be limited in after-acquired evidence 
cases to reflect the employee's failure to defeat the employer's 
affirmative defense and to avoid a limitation of the remedy. 
The McKennon decision has been criticized as devaluing the 
employer's rights and the public's interest in deterring misconduct.33 
Commentators have utilized the example of convicted criminals who have 
omitted their convictions from application materials, thereby depriving 
employers of the opportunity to make informed hiring decisions.34 
Arguably, individuals who know they will be entitled to recovery if they 
become victims of discrimination may not be sufficiently deterred from 
attempting to gain access to the workplace by deceit. 
The deterrence argument assumes, however, that employees or 
applicants commit the misconduct with the expectation that they will 
suffer discrimination in the future. This assumption is unrealistic since 
the likelihood that any particular individual will suffer employment 
discrimination and prevail in a court action is unpredictable and 
minute. An employee whose misconduct is undeterred by the fear of 
discovery, by the threat of criminal action, or by moral considerations, 
would certainly not be deterred by the remote chance that he or she 
will suffer discrimination in the future and be unable to obtain a 
complete recovery because of past wrongdoing. 
Furthermore, as one commentator has suggested, employers that 
are injured by employee misconduct may file counterclaims against the 
employee, seeking their own relief.35 Thus, an employee who makes 
costly mistakes because he or she does not have the qualifications 
claimed on the resume or who violates company policy, thereby 
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injuring the employer, may be entitled to damages for discrimination 
but may also be liable to the employer for the wrongful conduct. 
The McKennon opinion strives to structure guidelines for remedies 
that consider both the rights of employees to be free of discrimination 
and "the lawful prerogatives of the employer in the usual course of its 
business." Given the. complexity and the sensitive nature of the issues 
involved in after-acquired evidence cases, the Court offered an 
admirably balanced approach to resolving damages issues implicating 
the competing rights, concerns, and injuries of the parties in such cases. 
Nevertheless, certain ambiguities and questions remain concerning the 
McKennon standard, which will continue to evolve and crystallize as 
relevant cases come before the EEOC and the courts. 
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